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INTRODUCTION 
Over 160,000 individuals in Tennessee are living in or near poverty 
and are uninsured because they do not qualify for Medicaid and cannot 
afford to buy insurance on their own.1 These individuals bear witness to a 
broken Medicaid program that is an artifact of historical judgments about 
the “deserving poor.”2 Medicaid has traditionally provided health care 
coverage only to certain categories of individuals living in poverty. 
Attempting to right this wrong, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (the “Affordable Care Act” or “ACA”) expanded Medicaid eligibility 
to essentially all individuals who fall at or below 133 percent of the federal 
poverty line. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB v. Sebelius)3 
unwound this federal remedy by making the Medicaid expansion optional 
for the states. 
In the wake of this decision, two options have emerged for states 
seeking to provide health care to the poor and uninsured, and more—
specifically individuals at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty line. 
The first option is for a state to accept the Medicaid expansion in 
accordance with the terms of the ACA. With this choice, a state would 
receive full federal funding for the program for the first three years, and no 
less than ninety percent funding after that point. The second option is for a 
state to apply for a waiver from the federal government to use federal 
Medicaid funds for premium subsidies that would enable the Medicaid 
expansion population to buy commercial insurance. Both options 
demonstrate an exemplar of cooperative governance—enabling the shared 
                                                 
 1. The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States That Do Not Expand 
Medicaid, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 5 (Oct. 23, 2013), http://kff.org/health-
reform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expand-
medicaid/. 
 2. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into 
Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2013), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/central/
jd/organizations/journals/bulr/volume92n4/documents/OUTTERSON.pdf. 
 3. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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goal of providing health care coverage for those in need to be achieved 
through federal funding and state flexibility. However, the waiver programs 
are subject to important limitations, namely, a waiver program must still 
promote the central goals of Medicaid. 
On March 27, 2013, in an address to the Tennessee General 
Assembly, Governor Bill Haslam announced a proposed plan (the 
“Tennessee Plan”) to pursue the second option for addressing the existing 
gap in Medicaid coverage.4 In lieu of expanding Medicaid eligibility 
through the route envisioned by the ACA, Governor Haslam proposed the 
Tennessee Plan, which would employ a federal waiver to direct federal 
Medicaid funds toward providing premium subsidies for low income 
Tennesseans. These premium subsidies would enable individuals in the 
Medicaid expansion population to purchase private coverage on the newly 
created health insurance marketplace.5 
This Article will examine these aspects of the Tennessee Plan in 
order to make the argument that Tennessee must either accept the Medicaid 
expansion as codified in the Affordable Care Act, or make modifications to 
the Tennessee Plan that better comport with the federal waiver program, the 
central goals of Medicaid, the United States Constitution, and the spirit of 
cooperative federalism. 
PART I. NFIB V. SEBELIUS: THE IMPACT  
OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION 
To put the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius into 
context, Part I of this Article contains two sections. Section A provides a 
brief background of the Medicaid program and the changes that the ACA, 
in its original form, attempted to incorporate. Section B analyzes the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning and the impact of the decision. 
A. Background of Medicaid before the ACA 
The Social Security Act of 1965 introduced the federal health care 
programs Medicare and Medicaid.6 In general, Medicare is a social 
insurance program with benefits available to disabled individuals and the 
elderly without regard to their means. Medicaid, on the other hand, has 
developed into a type of welfare program for eligible recipients who meet a 
threshold economic need and are within a category of people deemed to be 
worthy of receiving aid. When originally passed by Congress, Medicaid 
covered specific populations that fell within conventional notions of the 
                                                 
 4. Haslam Unveils ‘Tennessee Plan’ for Health Care Reform, TN.GOV (Mar. 27, 
2013, 9:51 AM), https://news.tn.gov/node/10458. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1)). 
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“deserving poor,”7 including the aged, blind, and permanently and totally 
disabled. The program also covered dependent children and their relative 
caretakers below specified poverty levels.8 By the 1980s, Medicaid was 
expanded to cover additional low-income children and pregnant women.9 
These rigid categories left many low-income individuals without access to 
Medicaid, most notably low-income, non-disabled, single adults. 
Though states can choose to cover additional populations, federal 
matching dollars are only available for the mandatory eligibility categories 
established by Congress. This dichotomy of state programmatic flexibility 
and federal financial constraint is an artifact of the very structure of 
Medicaid. The Medicaid program is an example of cooperative federalism, 
wherein the federal government provides a significant portion of federal 
funds for a specified program that is then implemented by the states.10 
Every state administers its own Medicaid program with joint funding from 
the federal government.11 Cooperative federalism is reflective of three 
attributes of the United States’ republican form of government: (1) state and 
federal governments share some common goals, including the goal of 
“promot[ing] the general welfare” of citizens;12 (2) the “power to lay and 
collect taxes”13 affords the federal government greater ability to finance 
programs that will realize shared goals; and (3) there are differences among 
the states that warrant some independence and flexibility in implementing 
these programs.14 
Seeking to provide coverage for all individuals living in poverty, 
the ACA established an income-based category that would have been 
mandatory in all states. Instead of eligibility dependent on both economic 
and categorical need, eligibility would been determined on means alone.15 
As drafted, the ACA required all states to expand their Medicaid programs 
to include this population, and states were offered 100 percent funding 
initially and dropping to 90 percent by 2020 to expand the Medicaid 
population. To the extent the state did not accept the funding to expand the 
Medicaid population, the Secretary for the Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”) had the discretion to withdraw all federal 
Medicaid funds from a state, including funding for non-expansion, pre-
                                                 
 7. Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 13. 
 8. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981). 
 9. Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 23. 
 10. See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 
(2002) (stating that Medicaid “is designed to advance cooperative federalism”). 
 11. Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 17–18. 
 12. U.S. Const. pmbl; see, e.g., Tenn. Const. art. I, § 2 (stating that government is 
“instituted for the common benefit”). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 14. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative 
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 669 (2001) (explaining that cooperative federalism 
provides states significant discretion in administering policies). 
 15. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2582. 
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ACA Medicaid populations. States opposing the Medicaid expansion, as 
well as other provisions of the ACA, brought suit, leading to the Supreme 
Court’s grant of certiorari in NFIB v. Sebelius.16 
B. Supreme Court Passing the Choice of Expansion to the States 
On the last day of the 2012 term, the Supreme Court finally issued 
its ruling in one of the most watched cases of the year, NFIB v. Sebelius.17 
Earlier that spring, the Court heard a nearly unprecedented six hours of oral 
argument18 related to four legal challenges raised against the health care 
law: the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act; the constitutionality of the 
individual mandate; the severability of the Affordable Care Act should the 
individual mandate be struck down; and whether the Medicaid expansion 
was unduly coercive.19 Most everyone watching this case, including legal 
scholars, assumed that the individual mandate was the Achilles heel of the 
Affordable Care Act.20 Thus, the Court’s June 28, 2012 decision caught 
many by surprise. 
In a plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the 
Court held that while the individual mandate was a permissible use of 
Congress’ taxing power,21 the Medicaid expansion was an 
unconstitutionally coercive exercise of the Spending Clause.22 In its brief, 
the National Federation of Independent Businesses—joined by a coalition 
of twenty-six states23—argued that the mandatory expansion of Medicaid to 
individuals living at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty line, when 
combined with the ability of the federal government to withhold existing 
Medicaid funding should a state fail to expand Medicaid eligibility, violated 
the anti-compulsion principles of the Spending Clause.24 And, for the first 
time in the history of American jurisprudence, a majority of the Supreme 
                                                 
 16. See generally Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 29–34 (providing information of 
the procedural posture regarding NFIB v. Sebelius). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Andrew Christy, ‘Obamacare’ Will Rank Among the Longest Supreme Court 
Arguments Ever, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 15, 2011, 5:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
itsallpolitics/2011/11/15/142363047/obamacare-will-rank-among-the-longest-supreme-
court-arguments-ever. 
 19. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581 (2012). 
 20. Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 3–4. 
 21. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (Ginsburg, J., Sotomayor, J., Kagan J., and Breyer, J. 
concurring). 
 22. Id. at 2606–07. 
 23. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256, 1263 n.1 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (“The states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, 
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, 
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.”). 
 24. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582. 
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Court agreed.25 Importantly, the Court did not strike down the expansion 
itself,26 though four justices would have.27 Instead, the Court prohibited the 
federal government from placing existing Medicaid federal funding in 
jeopardy should a state choose not to expand Medicaid.28 The practical 
effect of this ruling was to make the Medicaid expansion optional for the 
states. 
Several aspects of this opinion are troubling, in particular, the way 
that the Court contorted the practical realities of those living in poverty, as 
well as the law, in order to reach the decision it did on the Medicaid 
expansion.29 The Court’s determination that the Medicaid expansion was 
unduly coercive relied, in part, on a finding that the Medicaid expansion 
represented a new Medicaid program.30 In the words of Chief Justice 
Roberts: 
The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in 
kind, not merely degree. The original program was 
designed to cover medical services for four particular 
categories of needy: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and 
needy families with dependent children. . . . Under the 
Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a 
program to meet the health care needs of the entire 
nonelderly population with income below 133 percent of 
the poverty level. It is no longer a program to care for the 
neediest among us, but rather an element of a 
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health 
care coverage.31 
As Chief Justice Roberts notes, until the passage of the Affordable 
Care Act, the Medicaid program only recognized certain categories of 
eligibility.32 These categories are artifacts of the Elizabethan poor laws, and 
serve as codified evidence of society’s normative determinations about the 
“deserving” and “undeserving” poor.33 In stating that those living under 133 
percent of the federal poverty line do not qualify as “the neediest among 
us,”34 Chief Justice Roberts contributes to this regrettable history rather 
than unwinding it, ignoring the realities of millions of Americans living in 
                                                 
 25. Id. at 2566, 2606–07, 2666 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
 26. Id. at 2607. 
 27. Id. at 2666 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 2607. 
 29. See id. at 2605–06. 
 30. See id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 13. 
 34. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (joined by Breyer J., and Kagan, J.). 
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poverty. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, “Single adults earning no 
more than $14,856 per year—133 percent of the current poverty level—
surely rank among the Nation’s poor.”35 
Some of the legal analysis in NFIB v. Sebelius is also troubling. 
The two legal questions at issue with respect to the Medicaid expansion 
were: (1) whether congressional action taken pursuant to the Spending 
Clause is subject to legally enforceable limits pursuant to the Tenth 
Amendment; and (2) whether Congress exceeded those limits in passing the 
Medicaid expansion.36 In his discussion, Chief Justice Roberts deftly 
intermingles case law addressing the limits of the Commerce Clause with 
that of the Spending Clause.37 In just a few paragraphs, two previously 
distinct areas of the law were seamlessly married. This union enabled the 
Court to create, for the first time ever, a limit on Congress’ authority to 
regulate states under the Spending Clause.38 However, in uniting these two 
areas of law, the Court gives little mind to the fundamental difference 
between the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause. The Commerce 
Clause cases that the Court cited in the opinion essentially ask the question, 
“To what extent can the federal government regulate the independent, non-
federally funded actions of the states?”39 In contrast, the cited case law in 
Spending Clause litigation asks the question, “When the federal 
government provides funding for a state program, what are the limits on the 
federal government’s ability to regulate that state program?”40 It seems 
intuitive that greater deference should be afforded to federal regulation 
when the government is regulating a program receiving federal funds.41 
However, in conflating these two areas of law, the opinion virtually ignores 
this common sense understanding.42 
Chief Justice Roberts does, however, note that this limitation only 
applies to actions under the Spending Clause that create a situation where 
the “[s]tate has no choice.”43 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the 
                                                 
 35. Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 2602–04. 
 37. For example, a paragraph that begins with the statement, “At the same time, our 
cases have recognized limits on Congress’s power under the Spending Clause,” contains 
citations to both Spending Clause and Commerce Clause case law. Id. at 2602 (citing Barnes 
v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (discussing Congress’ power under the Spending 
Clause), Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (discussing 
Congress’ power under the Spending Clause), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
156–60 (1992) (discussing Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause)). 
 38. Id. at 2630. 
 39. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 156–60. 
 40. See, e.g., Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186; Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17. 
 41. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 101 
(1989) (“In other words, the spending power is different from the commerce power relative 
to the Tenth Amendment. . . . Even the seminal case creating the anti-commandeering 
principle recognizes this distinction.”) (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 144). 
 42. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602. 
 43. Id. at 2603. 
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Medicaid expansion falls into this “no choice” category because the 
Medicaid program is so large and expensive and states have “developed 
intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the course of many 
decades to implement . . . Medicaid.”44 In other words, the actions of 
Congress should be limited because the federal government has been too 
generous and the states have become too reliant on this program. As Justice 
Ginsberg asked, “[I]s it not passing strange to suggest that the purported 
incursion on state sovereignty might have been averted, or at least 
mitigated, had Congress offered the [s]tates less money to carry out the 
same obligations?”45 Indeed, the Roberts opinion turns the logic of 
cooperative federalism on its head. 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion discounts the very core of the 
Medicaid system—cooperative federalism. Essentially, cooperative federal 
programs exist because there are solutions to societal problems that states 
cannot afford to address and there are particularized state issues that cannot 
be fully accommodated by one-size-fits-all federal programs. Chief Justice 
Roberts’s opinion renders the federal strength the enemy of state flexibility, 
instead of recognizing that they are both necessary components of 
successful cooperative governance. Regardless, the impact of the Court’s 
opinion is clear: the baton has been passed to the states. 
PART II. PROVIDING HEALTH CARE TO THE POOR AND UNINSURED: 
STATE OPTIONS REGARDING MEDICAID EXPANSION 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, states 
wishing to provide Medicaid coverage to ACA’s now statutorily defined 
Medicaid population have two choices: (1) expand Medicaid in accordance 
with the ACA or (2) apply for a 1115 waiver to administer a state plan. 
Tennessee is opting for the second option. Part II of this Article contains 
two sections to put Tennessee’s decision into context. Section A details the 
1115 waiver option, specifically the limitations associated with these state 
plan alternatives. Section B breaks down the status of the state decisions 
regarding expansion at the time of this Article’s publication, including the 
states choosing traditional expansion or an alternative state plan under 
1115, as well as the states choosing to not expand their Medicaid programs. 
A. Medicaid Law Governing State Plan Alternatives 
As noted above, Medicaid is an example of cooperative 
federalism.46 With respect to Medicaid, a state is allowed some flexibility in 
shaping its program by choosing from various federally authorized options 
                                                 
 44. Id. at 2604. 
 45. Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
 46. See Wis. Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002) 
(stating that Medicaid “is designed to advance cooperative federalism.”). 
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which policies to include in a state plan;47 however, the federal government 
has established certain minimum benefits and protections that must be 
provided should a state accept federal Medicaid funds.48 Section 1115 of 
the Social Security Act49 provides a significant exception: States may apply 
to receive waivers of specific federal Medicaid standards in order to 
implement an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the 
judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of” 
the Social Security Act.50 
The statutory authority to conduct experimental demonstration 
projects was added to the Social Security Act in 1962,51 and when the 
Social Security Act was amended in 1965 to create the Medicaid program, 
this waiver authority extended to this new federal health program.52 
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary is allowed to waive the 
requirements spelled out in the United States Code.53 Thus, these 1115 
waivers enable states, subject to the approval of the Secretary, to implement 
broad changes to the structure of the Medicaid program. For example, in 
1993, Tennessee received approval for a demonstration project that 
transformed Tennessee’s Medicaid program from a traditional fee-for-
service program into Medicaid managed care.54 The 1115 waiver is also the 
mechanism through which Tennessee can pursue an alternative to the 
Medicaid expansion. 
Despite affording the states a great deal of flexibility, there are 
several important limitations that govern the approval, review, and renewal 
of 1115 waivers. Specifically, when reviewing a waiver proposal, the 
Secretary must consider three important features of the proposed program. 
First, the Secretary must consider whether the proposed project is truly 
experimental.55 When Congress created this waiver authority, it specified 
that the purpose of the authority is to “test out new ideas and ways of 
dealing with the problems of public welfare recipients.”56 At the time of 
enactment, Congress specified that the waivers were “expected to be 
                                                 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2011). 
 48. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1985). 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2011). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Wilbur J. Cohen & Robert M. Ball, Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 and 
Proposals for Health Insurance for the Aged, 25 SOC. SEC. BULL. 3, 3 (1962), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v25n10/v25n10p3.pdf. 
 52. Social Security Amendments of 1965. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a). 
 54. See TennCare Overview, http://www.tn.gov/tenncare/news-about.shtml (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2013); TennCare Timeline, http://www.tn.gov/tenncare/news-timeline.shtml 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a); see also Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 380 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 56. S. Res. 1589, 87th Cong. (1962) (enacted); see also H.R. Res. 1414, 87th Cong. 
(1962) (enacted). 
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selectively approved by the Department.”57 Read in concert, these 
statements of congressional intent demonstrate that 1115 waivers were 
intended to be a unique mechanism for testing unique programs. The import 
of this limitation—that Section 1115 waivers must be used to test a novel, 
experimental program—has also been recognized by the courts.58 For 
example, in a case finding that the Secretary had exceeded the scope of her 
approval authority, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[a] simple benefits cut, 
which might save money, but has no research or experimental goal, would 
not satisfy this requirement.”59 
Second, the Secretary must make a determination that the proposed 
project is “likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the Medicaid] 
Act.”60 In other words, the projected outcomes of an experimental program 
must serve the central goals of Medicaid. The goals of Medicaid are clearly 
stated in the Social Security Act.61 The Medicaid program was designed 
”to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families 
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled 
individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to 
meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2) 
rehabilitation and other services to help such families and 
individuals attain or retain capability for independence or 
self-care . . . .”62 
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act, this list was expanded to 
include single, childless adults living at or below 133 percent of the federal 
poverty line.63 
Third, the Secretary must make a determination regarding the 
“extent and . . . period” necessary for the project.64 This language reflects 
the congressional intent that these waivers should be not just limited in 
frequency (thus the requirement that programs be unique), but also limited 
in scope and duration.65 Though these requirements have since been 
relaxed, past demonstration waivers were typically approved for a short 
                                                 
 57. S. Res. 1589, 87th Cong. (1962) (enacted). 
 58. Beno, 30 F.3d at 1069. 
 59. Id. (emphasis added). 
 60. 42 U.S.C § 1315(a); see Grier v. Goetz, 402 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (M.D. Tenn. 
2005) (noting that TennCare is a “special demonstration project authorized by the . . . 
Secretary . . . pursuant to the waiver authority conferred by section 1115 of the Social 
Security Act.”); see also Newton-Nations, 660 F.3d at 374; Beno, 30 F.3d at 1061. 
 61. 42 U.S.C. § 1396–1 (2011). 
 62. Id. 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
 64. 42 U.S.C § 1315(a); see also Newton-Nations, 660 F.3d at 380; Beno, 30 F.3d at 
1061–71. 
 65. See 42 U.S.C § 1315(a). 
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(three to five year), non-renewable term, and often were not statewide in 
scope.66 
Additionally, when a state has proposed a waiver from cost-sharing 
requirements, the Secretary must evaluate the proposed plan under Section 
1396o(f), an even more rigorous waiver evaluation standard.67 Cost-sharing 
can be broadly defined as payments that must be made before medical 
services can be obtained.68 Examples of cost-sharing include copayments, 
coinsurance, and deductibles.69 The Social Security Act sets strict limits on 
cost-sharing,70 but states may apply for waivers from these requirements.71 
In contrast to the broader language of Section 1115 of the Social Security 
Act, Section 1396o(f) details a highly circumscribed waiver authority for 
cost sharing requirements.72 Pursuant to Section 1396o(f), cost sharing 
programs proposed under Section 1115 must: (1) be approved by the 
Secretary; (2) last no longer than two years; (3) test a unique and 
“previously untested” use of cost-sharing; (4) provide benefits that are not 
outweighed by risks to beneficiaries; (5) be based on a reasonable 
hypothesis that will be tested in a “methodologically sound manner”; and 
(6) be voluntary or contain provisions to address any damage to beneficiary 
health as a result of mandatory participation.73 
B. Current Status of State Decisions Regarding the Medicaid 
Expansion 
At the time of this publication, twenty-five states and the District of 
Columbia are moving forward with the Medicaid expansion, nineteen are 
not moving forward, and the debate is considered ongoing in six states, 
including Tennessee.74 However, this breakdown is subject to additional 
nuance. Three of the states that have been categorized as “moving forward 
with an expansion” (Arkansas, Iowa, and Michigan) have pursued an 
alternative means of expanding access to health care coverage.75 
Additionally, in three states where the debate is considered ongoing 
                                                 
 66. Jane Perkins, Fact Sheet: Federal Authority to Approve Medicaid Demonstration 
Projects, NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM (July 2005), http://www.oregonadvocates.org/geo/
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Servs. Sec’y (June 22, 1993)). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(f) (2006). 
 68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396o-1(a)(3) (2006). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a); 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.51–.53 (2014). 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(f). 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014, THE HENRY J. 
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/state-activity-around-
expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/#map (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
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(Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee), an alternative means of expansion 
is considered the most likely route to expanded coverage.76 It is this 
category—the alternative means of expanding coverage—that occupies the 
central focus of this Article. Arkansas,77 Iowa,78 and Michigan79 have all 
submitted formal proposals to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”) for a demonstration project that creates some form of a 
commercial insurance alternative, and these proposals were approved.80 
Indiana81 and Pennsylvania82 have submitted proposals, but they have not 
yet been approved by CMS.83 Tennessee, however, has not yet submitted a 
formal proposal, but Governor Haslam has indicated to HHS Secretary 
Kathleen Sebelius that the State would like to explore a commercial 
insurance alternative, the Tennessee Plan.84 The details of the Tennessee 
Plan—as sparse as they are—as well as the mechanism through which the 
State will seek approval for this demonstration project, are explained at 
greater length below. 
PART III. THE TENNESSEE PLAN:  
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MEDICAID EXPANSION 
Central to the goal of the traditional Medicaid expansion is 
covering those currently poor and uninsured individuals at or below 133 
percent of the federal poverty line. While alternative state programs must 
have this same end goal of providing health care to the expansion 
population, the outcome of alternative, experimental programs will not 
                                                 
 76. Id. 
 77. Arkansas Health Care Independence Program (Private Option), CENTERS FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/ar-private-option-
ca.pdf; see also Arkansas 1115 Waiver Application, ARK. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., DIV. OF 
MED. SERVS., https://www.medicaid.state.ar.us/Download/general/comment/
FinalHCIWApp.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
 78. Iowa Marketplace Choice Plan Section 1115 Demonstration, CENTERS FOR 
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-
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 79. Healthy Michigan Plan, MICH. DEP’T OF CMTY. HEALTH, http://www.michigan.
gov/mdch/0,4612,7-132-2941_4868_4897-299404--,00.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014). 
 80. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014, supra note 74. 
 81. Healthy Indiana Plan 1115 Waiver Extension Application, IND. FAMILY AND SOC. 
SERV. ADMIN. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.in.gov/aca/files/April122013HIPWaiver
ExtensionApp.pdf. 
 82. Draft Healthy Pennsylvania 1115 Demonstration Application, PA. DEP’T OF PUB. 
WELFARE, (Dec. 2013), http://www.dpw.state.pa.us/ucmprd/groups/webcontent/documents/
document/p_039654.pdf. 
 83. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014, supra note 74. 
 84. Letter from Governor Bill Haslam to Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Apr. 1, 2013) 
[hereinafter Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013] (on file with author). 
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necessarily be the same as traditional programs because the means of an 
alternative program differ from traditional expansion. The Tennessee Plan 
in its current form may prove to be an example of this problem—potentially 
causing harm to the State’s expansion population. Furthermore, regardless 
of the potential effect of the Tennessee Plan, the State’s requests appear too 
far afield from the central goals of Medicaid such that the Secretary would 
deny certain portions or the entirety of the Tennessee Plan. Either partial or 
full denial could prevent an enactment of an alternative program in 
Tennessee; thus, the expansion population would be denied proper benefits. 
For example, even if the Secretary strikes only certain provisions, the State 
would be left with a plan that is considerably less flexible. The new 
program may be too inflexible for the State to have sufficient support to 
implement an alternative plan. 
To analyze these problems, Part III contains four sections. Section 
A provides an overview of the Tennessee Plan in its current form. Section B 
addresses the sunset clause and payment reform in the Tennessee Plan. 
Next, Section C analyzes the potential issues with certain Medicaid benefits 
for the expansion population and provides recommendations for two 
Medicaid benefits: early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment, 
known as “EPSDT”; and non-emergency transportation. Finally, Section D 
identifies two Medicaid protections in the Tennessee Plan—cost-sharing 
and due process—that might be insufficient for the Secretary to approve of 
their implementation. 
A. Overview 
In Tennessee, there are at least 161,500 individuals who would be 
eligible for Medicaid if the State adopted coverage for the expansion 
population.85 This sizable group of uninsured individuals includes 
thousands of childless men and women, veterans, African-Americans, and 
parents who can no longer claim their children as dependents, but are not 
old enough to qualify for Medicare. Furthermore, approximately half of 
Tennessee’s expansion population is among the working poor.86 In other 
words, categorical eligibility has created large gaps in coverage, excluding 
many Americans who are living in poverty, and these gaps are evident in 
Tennessee. Despite Chief Justice Roberts’ assertions to the contrary, for the 
hundreds of thousands of Tennesseans who are made more vulnerable by 
poverty and lack of access to health insurance, the Medicaid expansion 
would have touched those in our state who are “the neediest among us.” 
On March 27, 2013, in an address to the Tennessee General 
Assembly, Governor Bill Haslam announced that that in lieu of expanding 
Medicaid eligibility as envisioned by the ACA, Tennessee would seek a 
waiver to use federal Medicaid funds to provide premium subsidies to low 
                                                 
 85. The Coverage Gap, supra note 1. 
 86. Id. 
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income Tennesseans, enabling them to purchase private coverage on the 
newly created health insurance marketplaces.87 In a letter to Secretary 
Sebelius dated April 1, 2013, Governor Haslam briefly outlined his 
proposed Tennessee Plan.88 Specifically, he requested the following 
concessions from the federal government: (1) the ability to use Medicaid 
expansion funding to purchase private plans for the expansion population 
on the health insurance marketplace; (2) permission to treat the Medicaid 
expansion population in the same manner as all others in the marketplace; 
(3) waiver of Medicaid cost-sharing rules, which would enable the state to 
impose cost sharing requirements on the expansion population that would 
be the same as those levied against individuals in the marketplace who are 
at 250 percent of the federal poverty line; (4) inclusion of a “circuit 
breaker” or sunset clause that would automatically end the program when 
federal funding declines; and (5) permission to implement provider 
payment reforms.89 
Essentially, the Tennessee Plan proposes using the federal 
Medicaid expansion funds to provide premium assistance to individuals in 
Tennessee who are currently not eligible for TennCare (the Tennessee 
Medicaid program) and who are living at or below 133 percent of the 
federal poverty line.90 If Tennessee had opted simply to expand Medicaid, 
all individuals under 133 percent of the federal poverty line who are 
currently not eligible for Medicaid would be able to get coverage through 
TennCare.91 For this “expansion population” the federal funding (also 
known as the federal match rate) would have been 100 percent for the first 
three years.92 Under the proposed Tennessee Plan, the federal funds that 
would have been used to provide a 100 percent match would now be 
distributed to individuals in the expansion population through premium 
subsidies.93 These individuals would use this premium assistance, which 
would cover the full cost of an annual insurance payment, to enroll in 
private insurance plans in the health insurance marketplace.94 Basically, 
these premiums would operate as health insurance vouchers for individuals 
in the expansion population. 
                                                 
 87. Haslam Unveils ‘Tennessee Plan’ for Health Care Reform, TN.GOV (Mar. 27, 
2013, 9:51 AM), https://news.tn.gov/node/10458. 
 88. Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013, supra note 84. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
 92. As a means of comparison, Tennessee’s match rate for individuals who are 
currently enrolled in Medicaid is roughly 66%, which means that for every two dollars that 
the government contributes to Tennessee for its Medicaid program, Tennessee must match 
this funding with a dollar of its own. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion 
Decision, 2014, supra note 74. 
 93. Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013, supra note 84. 
 94. Id. 
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At a broad, conceptual level, this alternative approach is fairly 
unobjectionable as federal funds will be used to provide coverage to those 
who are currently uninsured, and thus—at first blush—though the means 
may be different, the end is the same. Additionally, the political climate in 
Tennessee is such that a public plan dressed in private plan clothes may be 
the only way that a Medicaid expansion can happen in the State.95 
However, as is often the case, the devil is in the details. The remainder of 
this section will discuss the components of the Tennessee Plan, and where 
necessary offer critiques and provide recommendations for moving 
forward. 
Before we break down the components of this request, a few 
general comments about the framework are necessary. The way the 
components are listed in the letter might suggest they bear equal weight and 
significance, but this appearance is misleading. The first concession 
requested by Governor Haslam would be the backbone of a Tennessee 1115 
waiver proposal. The commercial insurance alternative to the Medicaid 
expansion is the novel and experimental program that Tennessee would be 
testing. The remaining requests, especially numbers two through four—
even if novel in their own right—are simply smaller components of a 
commercial insurance alternative. The next section will briefly address the 
larger concept of a private pay alternative and then provide a more detailed 
discussion of the individual components of this alternative plan. 
B. Sunset Clause and Payment Reform 
The last two requests on the list submitted by Governor Haslam—a 
circuit breaker and provider payment reforms—warrant less attention than 
the other requested concessions, and for purposes of this Article, a brief 
discussion will suffice. First, from a budgetary standpoint, Tennessee’s 
request makes little sense, as the amount of federal funding that 
accompanies a Medicaid expansion will likely create a budget surplus 
beyond the first three years when the expansion is fully funded.96 
Nevertheless, three years of coverage for the currently uninsured is better 
than the alternative, which is absolutely no coverage for this population. 
The sunset provision also complies with the requirement that 1115 waivers 
be limited in duration.97 Accordingly, the inclusion of a sunset clause 
should not be viewed as a barrier in the waiver approval process. 
                                                 
 95. See Abby Rapoport, The Conservative Plan for Medicaid Expansion, THE AMER. 
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Second, although Tennessee’s proposal does not provide a great 
deal of specificity with respect to payment reform, this lack of specificity 
should not serve as barrier for waiver approval either. In his March 27 
address before the Tennessee Legislature, Governor Haslam stated the 
following: “During that period when our costs are covered 100 percent by 
the federal government, we’d work with our medical care providers to 
implement true payment reform. I am confident that working together, we 
could truly reduce medical costs.”98 Tennessee has a long history with 
provider payment reform. In fact, the State’s first 1115 waiver, which 
created one of the first Medicaid managed care programs in the country, 
was a dramatic and novel form of provider payment reform.99 With the 
important caveat that provider payment reform should not impact the 
quality of care provided to the beneficiary, this request is unobjectionable. 
In fact, it is arguably aligned with the larger goals of the Affordable Care 
Act,100 and, as implied by Governor Haslam’s letter to the Secretary, could 
likely be done even absent an 1115 waiver.101 
C. Medicaid Benefits 
In his April 1, 2013 letter, Governor Haslam requested, inter alia, 
approval from the Secretary for the following condition: “The Medicaid 
Expansion group will be treated the same as others enrolled in the 
[marketplace plans]. They will have access to the same benefits and appeals 
process as all other enrollees in these plans.”102 Though this request might 
appear innocuous and perhaps even “reasonable,”103 it threatens to 
undermine the health care services available to a poor and vulnerable 
population that is now a statutorily defined Medicaid population.104 The 
Supreme Court’s decision did not strike down this eligibility category; it 
simply removed the penalty that could be levied against states for their 
                                                 
 98. Bill Haslam, Governor of Tenn., Remarks to the Tenn. General Assemb. (Mar. 27, 
2013), https://news.tn.gov/sites/default/files/032713_Tennessee%27s_Plan_for_Health_
Care_Reform_-_As_Prepared.pdf [hereinafter Haslam Remarks]. 
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failure to recognize this category.105 However, if a state accepts federal 
funds for this eligibility category, or any other, that state must comply with 
federal Medicaid law.106 Thus, individuals who are not otherwise eligible 
for Medicaid and are living at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty 
line are Medicaid beneficiaries, and are thus entitled to the full scope of 
benefits and protections afforded to them under Medicaid law. 
The Secretary has issued guidance to this effect.107 On March 29, 
2013, as support for a commercial insurance alternative began to swell in 
some states, the Secretary issued a short memo in the form of “Frequently 
Asked Questions,” or “FAQs,” that provided guidance to states that were 
working to develop alternative plans.108 This memo clearly states that 
“beneficiaries remain Medicaid beneficiaries and continue to be entitled to 
all benefits and cost sharing protections.”109 Further, the Secretary advised 
that “[s]tates must have mechanisms in place to ‘wrap-around’ private 
coverage to the extent that benefits are less and cost sharing requirements 
are greater than those in Medicaid.”110 Having issued this guidance, the 
Secretary is theoretically constrained from reversing course.111 
Accordingly, states seeking approval of 1115 waivers for alternative 
expansion plans should heed the guidance provided in the March 29 
FAQs.112   
Two Medicaid benefits in particular warrant additional 
examination. Though descriptions of the Tennessee Plan have been notably 
circumscribed, one can readily compare the mandatory benefits that must 
be provided to all Medicaid beneficiaries with the essential health benefits 
that are required for all plans sold on the marketplace.113 Two important 
mandatory Medicaid services that would likely be excluded in the 
Tennessee Plan’s waiver proposal are EPSDT and non-emergency 
transportation. Our recommendations with respect to these services will be 
addressed in turn below. 
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1. EPSDT 
The EPSDT requirements were incorporated into the Social 
Security Act as part of the 1967 Social Security Act Amendments.114 The 
program, which was recommended by President Lyndon Johnson, was 
designed to meet the unmet medical needs of millions of America’s 
children—unmet needs that were creating a population of unnecessarily 
disabled adults.115 The broad, comprehensive, and mandatory requirements 
of the EPSDT program116 have made it “the single most important public 
policy effort ever undertaken to define an appropriate health services 
coverage standard embedded in developmental pediatric practice.”117 As 
one Tennessee court has described: 
EPSDT covers a broad range of services. As the name 
suggests, the purpose of EPSDT is to ensure that all 
Medicaid-eligible children receive regular screening, 
vision, hearing, dental and treatment services consistent 
with established pediatric standards. The Federal Code 
requires that the children receive ‘such other necessary 
health care, diagnostic services, treatment and other 
measures . . . to correct or ameliorate defects and physical 
and mental illnesses under the State plan.’ 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396d(r)(5). The purpose of EPSDT is to ensure that 
underserved children receive preventive health care and 
follow-up treatment. EPSDT is premised on the idea that 
early detection of problems will lead to treatment of minor 
problems before they become major healthcare issues. By 
preemptively screening, diagnosing and treating current 
problems, EPSDT staves off larger healthcare problems in 
the future, and ultimately results in a more efficient and 
effective healthcare system with a proactive, 
comprehensive, and long-term focus.118 
As noted above, though health plans on the marketplace are 
required to offer a core group of benefits,119 their coverage will not be as 
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extensive as what is required by EPSDT.120 Approximately 750,000 
children in Tennessee are eligible for EPSDT services through the 
TennCare program.121 Thus, EPSDT is an enormously important program 
for Tennessee’s children. An EPSDT waiver puts health of Tennessee’s 
children in jeopardy, runs counter to the guidance provided by the 
Secretary, and should not be a part of a Tennessee 1115 waiver application. 
2. Non-emergency Transportation 
Federal law requires state Medicaid programs to provide non-
emergency transportation to certain qualified Medicaid enrollees—for 
example, children and families who need transportation to access EPSDT 
services.122 While transportation is not explicitly mentioned in the Social 
Security Act, it is an administrative requirement created by the Secretary,123 
which has the force of law.124 When the issue of transportation was raised 
in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, that court 
noted the following about sub-regulatory guidance that has been offered by 
the Secretary about the transportation assurance regulation: 
The Secretary of HHS has interpreted the application of the 
transportation assurance regulation, which has the force of 
law, in the Medical Assistance Manual (MAM). According 
to the MAM, the transportation requirement is an integral 
component of a statutory scheme whose aim is to further 
the federal government’s commitment to ensure adequate 
medical care for the needy. In the MAM, the Secretary 
points out that ‘the Medicaid program has, from the 
beginning (1966), encouraged [s]tates to arrange for 
transportation for recipients to and from necessary medical 
care.’ The regulation requiring the assurance of 
transportation is ‘based on the recognition, from past 
program operation experience, that unless needy 
individuals can actually get to and from providers of 
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services, the entire goal of a [s]tate Medicaid program is 
inhibited at the start.’125 
As the language from the Secretary suggests, transportation is a 
vital component of ensuring that low-income individuals can actually 
access the care to which they are entitled. It is so vital in fact, that denying 
transportation services would defeat “the entire goal of a [s]tate Medicaid 
program.”126 Section 1115 waivers must, as a matter of federal law, be used 
to test programs that promote the objectives of the Medicaid program.127 It 
is difficult to imagine what experimental value a denial of transportation 
services could provide and such a denial is clearly at odds with the goals of 
Medicaid. Accordingly, such a waiver request would be detrimental to 
Tennessee citizens, is likely to be denied by the Secretary, and should not 
be included in a Tennessee 1115 waiver proposal. 
D. Medicaid Protections 
The Tennessee Plan must incorporate adequate protections of the 
expansion population for the Secretary to approve its program. Two areas 
of the Tennessee Plan in particular raise possible problems. The first 
subsection identifies economic inequalities in the cost-sharing program as 
well as the burden of the State to demonstrate the novelty of the cost-
sharing program. The second subsection addresses the due process of 
Medicaid beneficiaries and the necessary considerations an alternative plan 
must contemplate. 
1. Cost-Sharing 
In his March 29, 2013 speech, Governor Haslam intimated that he 
would request waiver approval from the Secretary for cost-sharing 
provisions that would—absent a waiver—conflict with federal law. At the 
time, he listed this request as a potential barrier to an agreement between 
HHS and the State of Tennessee: 
HHS says we have to provide additional benefits, above 
and beyond what everyone else in the exchange will 
receive. We’ll also have to follow certain Medicaid-driven 
guidelines when it comes to co-pays and the appeals 
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process instead of allowing these individuals to be treated 
like everyone else in private insurance plans.128 
Nevertheless, this request appeared in the list of concessions 
mentioned in the State’s April 1 letter.129 Specifically, Governor Haslam 
requested permission to implement “[c]ost sharing requirements for the 
Medicaid Expansion group [that] will be the same as other enrollees in the 
market place with incomes below 250 percent of poverty.”130 The Governor 
stated that his cost-sharing plan is designed to ensure that “the user has 
some skin in the game when it comes to health care incentives.”131 
As described above, the Social Security Act imposes additional, 
more stringent requirements on proposals seeking waiver of federal cost-
sharing limitations.132 Though the nuances of federal cost-sharing 
requirements are beyond the scope of this Article, in broad terms only 
“nominal” co-pays can be assessed against the categorically needy,133 which 
now includes the expansion population, and several categories and services 
are excluded from deductibles, co-pays, and other payments, including 
pregnancy-related services134 and treatment provided to children pursuant to 
EPSDT.135 
From an economic perspective, this request makes little sense. It 
would impose co-pays on individuals making between zero and $15,281.70 
per year at the same levels as those making at least twice as much, 
$28,725.136 Given the high cost of the co-pays (equal to those levied against 
individuals at 250 percent of the federal poverty line), it is unlikely that this 
program could provide “benefits that aren’t outweighed by risks to 
beneficiaries.”137 Additionally, as noted above, “[a] simple benefits cut, 
which might save money, but has no research or experimental goal, would 
not satisfy this requirement.”138 Though more details may emerge, 
Governor Haslam’s stated justification seems unlikely to satisfy the 
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requirement that a cost-sharing program has research or experimental value. 
Additionally, as one court has noted, “[O]ver the last [thirty-five] years, a 
number of studies have looked at the effects of cost sharing on the poor. Of 
all forms of cost sharing, copayments are the most heavily studied.”139 
Because “new” cost-sharing approaches have been tried for over thirty-five 
years, at this point it is hard to imagine a novel program that would have 
true experimental value. Further, the body of research that has emerged 
from these experimental projects demonstrates that cost-sharing is an 
ineffective and detrimental way to manage care for low-income patients,140 
which would make it difficult for Tennessee to demonstrate that this cost-
sharing was not detrimental to enrollees. 
Given both the economic inequity of the cost-sharing program 
proposed and the challenge of proposing a cost-sharing program that will 
test out a novel approach for managing health care delivery to low-income 
beneficiaries, the Secretary would be constrained in her ability to approve 
the program proposed by Governor Haslam. 
2. Due Process 
In his speech before the legislature, Governor Haslam also 
indicated that the Tennessee Plan would require a waiver of due process 
protections afforded to Medicaid beneficiaries.141 This request was repeated 
in his April 1, 2013 letter.142 
The due process rights of Medicaid beneficiaries are rooted in the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution143 and reinforced by 
the statutory language of the Social Security Act.144 The breadth of these 
protections was given shape in the landmark case, Goldberg v. Kelly.145 
Under Goldberg, “when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination 
evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process.”146 
This pre-termination hearing must take place before an impartial decision 
                                                 
 139. Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting the 
plaintiff’s public health expert’s statement); see, e.g., Robert H. Brook et. al, The Effect of 
Coinsurance on the Health of Adults, (Dec. 1984), available at http://www.rand.org/content/
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 141. Haslam Remarks, supra note 98. 
 142. Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013, supra note 84. 
 143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 144. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (requiring state plans to “provide for granting an 
opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for 
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 145. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 146. Id. at 264. 
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maker147 after timely notice of the denial148 and provide, inter alia, the 
opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses and have representation by 
an attorney, if the beneficiary so chooses.149 
In his letter to the Secretary, Governor Haslam requested 
permission to go forward with a waiver application that included a proposal 
that would treat the Medicaid expansion population “the same as all others 
enrolled in the [marketplace;] [t]hey will have access to the same . . . 
appeals process as all other enrollees in these plans.”150 Though it is unclear 
what appeal procedures will be available in the marketplace, the Governor’s 
intent to seek a waiver to substitute those marketplace appeal procedures 
implies that they will be less robust than Medicaid’s procedures, since a 
waiver would only be required if the Tennessee Plan offered less protection 
to enrollees. Recall, however, that the scope of the Secretary’s waiver 
authority is limited. Though, as noted above, Section 1396(a) does include 
language about notice and a fair hearing, this is a supplement to—not 
independent of—the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. 
And, while the Secretary has authority to waive Section 1396(a) provisions, 
the Secretary cannot waive the Constitution; doing so would exceed the 
scope of her authority and subject a waiver program to judicial challenge. 
Accordingly, Tennessee, and other states considering an alternative to the 
Medicaid expansion must afford these categorically defined Medicaid 
beneficiaries with the full scope of due process protections as required by 
Goldberg and the United States Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
By rendering the Medicaid expansion optional, the Supreme Court 
placed on the states the responsibility for addressing an enormous and 
inequitable hole in one of this country’s most important safety net 
programs. In his lead opinion, Chief Justice Roberts likened the ACA’s 
Medicaid expansion requirement to the federal government telling a state: 
“your money or your life.”151 Setting aside any disagreement with this 
characterization, it is clear that even if this premise can be accepted, the 
pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. If the proposals that 
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have been presented to the Secretary—both the letter sent from Governor 
Haslam, and the formal proposals offered by Iowa and Arkansas—are any 
indication, several aspects of these alternative plans threaten to undermine 
the central goals of Medicaid, the fundamental purpose of the Section 1115 
waiver program, and the spirit of cooperative federalism. 
Tennessee is faced with the opportunity to right the inequity of 
archaic categorical Medicaid eligibility categories and provide coverage to 
over 160,000 uninsured Tennesseans.152 This opportunity comes with an 
unprecedented level of federal funding and a demonstrated willingness 
from the Secretary to consider experimental programs. To shift the 
pendulum back to center and ensure that expanded access to care can 
happen in Tennessee, the State must act in a manner that respects the shared 
goal of providing for the general welfare of Tennesseans. In short, it must 
cooperate. 
                                                 
 152.  The Coverage Gap, supra note 1, at 5. 
